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 On April 27th, 2018, philanthropist Bill Gates presented at the Massachusetts Medical 
Society’s annual meeting his growing concern of the next large-scale pandemic. Using a 
simulation created by Institute for Disease Modeling, Gates hoped to open the public’s eyes to 
the growing threat influenza and other infectious diseases pose to the world. This simulation 
predicted that a pandemic new influenza strain similar in severity to the 1918 Spanish Influenza 
would likely kill 30 million people worldwide within six months1. Gates, like many other public 
health officials and researchers, believes that infectious diseases represent a very real global 
security threat and should be treated through this lens. Such a threat, though, cannot be 
eliminated through negotiation and affects more than just a handful of countries. The next 
pandemic is capable of changing the foundations of the global community, and is a threat that 
many experts feel the world is not ready to face.  
Pandemics are officially defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as the world 
wide spread of a new disease, although many ancient outbreaks, such as the Black Death, have 
been given this designation based more on severity of the disease than global reach2. Most 
pandemics occur due to infection by a novel virus, emergence, or reemergence of bacterium. 
Regardless of the characteristics of pandemics, all tend to have large impacts on both infected 
countries and the world as a whole. These diseases have claimed millions of lives, created large 
economic losses, and interrupted the growth and development of numerous countries.  
Influenza virus strains remain the most commonly observed and largest reaching 
pandemics in history3. On average, two flu pandemics occur each century, although the 1900’s 
                                                      
1 Bill Gates. “Shattuck Lecture - Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.” 2018. 
2 WHO. 2015. “What Is a Pandemic?” WHO. 
3 Ibid. 
 6 
saw three major outbreaks suggesting we may see an increase of influenza pandemics in the 
future4. But these numbers fail to address the numerous non-influenza pandemics seen 
throughout history, such as HIV/AIDs pandemic which started in the 1981. Since the turn of the 
current century the world has already witnessed two pandemics: the 2002 severe acute repository 
syndrome pandemic (SARS) and the 2009 swine flu pandemic. SARS gained the designation of 
the century’s first pandemic not for its high infection rate (only 8,422 people contracted SARS), 
but rather its quick spread to over 29 countries in seven months5. Meanwhile swine flu infected 
over 60 million people in the United States alone during the 2009 flu season6. While both 
pandemics infected varying numbers of people, their ability to reach numerous countries around 
the globe highlights both the continued rise in urban areas and the growing interconnectedness of 
the world. These attributes of our modern world create a greater risk of disease spread and death 
compared to any historic pandemics, leaving the globe at a more vulnerable position than ever 
for the next big pandemic. 
The growing risk of such a pandemic coupled with the projected spread and death tolls of 
the threat creates the need to stop this global disaster before it occurs. The best way to stop a 
large-scale pandemic is to prevent such a disease from spreading to and through human 
populations. Prevention, however, requires the global health community to accurately predict 
what the culprit pathogen and provide the proper resources to either completely stop the spread 
of the novel pathogen to humans or contain the disease as a local outbreak. This thesis will 
                                                      
4 Edward Hill, Michael Tildesley, and Thomas House. 2017. “How Predictable Are Flu 
Pandemics?” Significance 14 (6): 28–33. 
5 James D Cherry, and Paul Krogstad. 2004. “SARS: The First Pandemic of the 21st Century.” 
Pediatric Research 56 (1): 1–5. 
6 Harvey V. Fineberg. 2014. “Pandemic Preparedness and Response — Lessons from the H1N1 
Influenza of 2009.” New England Journal of Medicine 370 (14): 1335–42.  
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evaluate the resources utilized in predicting the next pandemic and the global public health 
system’s ability to fight against novel pathogens. In the first chapter, I will set the stage by 
describing past pandemics and their effects on society, as well as how improving public health 
has changed the threats posed by future pandemic diseases. The second chapter will provide 
background on some of the major organizations that play key roles in pandemic preparedness 
and response. From there, I will evaluate our current inability to predict and respond to disease 
outbreaks and the repercussions of such failures using the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic as a 
case study. The fourth chapter will look at using molecular modifications as a method of 
predicting pandemics and explore the practicality and ethics behind such techniques. In my final 
chapter, I will assert that we cannot predict pandemics. Rather, I will propose improvements to 
our current public health system that emphasizes surveillance, finding molecular similarities 
between viruses, and improving vaccine technologies in order to best prepare for the next 
pandemic.  
 
Chapter 1: Past Pandemics and the Current State of Global Public Health 
When the first World War ended in 1918, over 37 million people worldwide died due to 
the conflict. The end of this historic war, though, did not mean the end of death and despair. 
1918 also marked the beginning of the modern world’s most severe influenza pandemic. 
Although the origins of the disease still remain unknown, some speculating it emerged in China7, 
while others believe a military base in Kansas8, this pandemic virus became the worst human 
natural disaster in history. Caused by a then new-to-humans strain of avian influenza virus A, 
                                                      
7 CDC. 2018. “Remembering the 1918 Influenza Pandemic | Features | CDC.” 2018. 
8 Ibid. 
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H1N1, this pathogen infected more than a third of the world’s population and killed over 50 
million people9. It has been just over a century since this deadly flu outbreak, and while recent 
influenza pandemics have not come close to the infection rates and death toll associated with the 
Spanish Influenza, many public health experts fear a big one is coming.  
 These mounting fears of the next large-scale pandemic often seem unwarranted with 
improvements in both public health and medical technology over the last century. In 1918, no 
influenza vaccine existed and the discovery of penicillin was still a decade away. Physicians of 
the time were at a loss on how to treat the disease, and were using all possible medical 
treatments, ranging from the ancient art of bleeding patients to administering oxygen10. Only 
blood transfusions from those who recovered appeared to have any real effect on treating new 
patients, but not to the extent needed to curb the mortality rate. Now, the world has an arsenal of 
medical and public health advances that has helped limit the spread of infectious diseases 
worldwide, and stopped pandemics from reaching the level of infection and death observed in 
1918. These improvements include the discovery of penicillin in 1928 and the creation of the 
inactivated flu vaccine in the 1940s, technological advances thought to have saved millions of 
lives11.  
 Despite these massive improvements in the technology used when treating people with 
infectious diseases, concerns surrounding a highly lethal pandemic should not be ignored. The 
1918 Spanish Influenza is not the only large-scale pandemic in human history that killed millions 
of people, suggesting that diseases of similar severity could occur again. Furthermore, pandemics 
                                                      
9 Ibid. 
10 Knobler, S., Alison Mack, Adel Mahmoud, and Stanley M Lemon. 2005. “The Story of 
Influenza.” Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats. 
11Claude Hannoun. 2013. “The Evolving History of Influenza Viruses and Influenza Vaccines.” 
Expert Review of Vaccines 12 (9): 1085–94.  
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have larger impacts on society than just the number of infections and deaths. Throughout history, 
pandemics of infectious diseases have left their imprint by influencing the economics, politics, 
and social structure of numerous nations and the international community, shaping the world we 
know today. 
 
A: Past Pandemics and Their Effects on Society 
 The Justinian Plague was one of the first recorded pandemics in human history, and the 
first with a confirmed pathogen: the bacterium Yersinia pestis. Occurring over a 200-year period 
between 530 and the mid-700’s, this pandemic started in Ethiopia, and quickly spread to Europe 
and Asia12. The Plague reached a peak in 542, killing nearly 5,000 people a day in the capital of 
the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople13. During a four-year span from 541 to 544 alone, over 
100 million people were thought to have died across Asia, Europe, and Africa14. The Justinian 
Plague did more than just kill millions, though, this plague pandemic affected the social and 
economic fabric of the medieval world.   
 Once the plague reached Constantinople, trade routes allowed for the bacterium to travel 
to the furthest reaches of the Byzantine Empire, killing millions. These deaths not only caused 
the elimination of small villages, but also dwindled the empire’s armies, leaving regions further 
from the capital more vulnerable to enemy attacks. By 568, northern Italy had fallen to the 
Lombards, and as the disease persisted through the 8th century, the provinces located in North 
Africa and the near East were absorbed by the rising Islamic Empire15. The plague further 
                                                      
12 John Frith. 2012. “The History of Plague- Part 1. The Three Great Pandemics.” 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. 
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weakened the Empire by decimating its agricultural and economic systems. Demand for a 
sustainable amount of food, as well as the same level of taxes pre-plague put an enormous strain 
on the now much smaller population. Farmers who survived began to over work the fields in an 
attempt to produce the meet the food demanded, leading to an eight-year famine16. The survivors 
struggle to purchase both food and pay their taxes, eventually fragmented the Byzantine Empire 
into the nations of Medieval Europe.  
 The disappearance of the plague in mid-8th century, and its repeated reemergence in both 
the 1300’s and late-1800’s in Europe and Asia continued to shape the societies of these regions. 
The Black Death during the 14th century killed a quarter of Europe’s population and once again 
lead entire villages becoming uninhabited and created a shortage of laborers17. Furthermore, the 
Black Death shaped societal interactions which continue today by shrinking the divide between 
the rich and the poor to make way for a middle class18. Meanwhile the Third Plague pandemic of 
1894 demonstrated the new interconnectedness of the world by spreading the plague via its host, 
the brown rat, from a rural province in China across the globe to Africa, Australia, and South 
America19.  
 The disease that truly shaped our modern world’s view of pandemics and acts as the 
baseline of what the next large-scale pandemic may look like is the 1918 Spanish Influenza 
outbreak. Although the origin of said pandemic remains hotly contested20 , no one can argue the 
extent of influenza’s reach. During the virus’s outbreak from 1918 to 1919 over 500 million 
                                                      
16 Ibid. 
17 Green, Monica. 2015. Pandemic disease in the medieval world: rethinking the Black Death.  
Vol. 1. Kalamazoo: Arc Medieval Press.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Firth, 2012. 
20 CDC. 2018. “Remembering the 1918 Influenza Pandemic | Features | CDC.” 2018. 
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people fell sick, a third of the global population. More so, over 50 million people around the 
world died from the flu pandemic, adding to the 37 million deaths from World War 1, which 
ended the year the pandemic began. Like the war itself, the Spanish Influenza killed primarily 
young adults, aged 18 to 40, who generally remain the healthiest during flu epidemics21. This 
discrepancy in the most affected age group likely stemmed from the fact that, unlike other flu 
outbreaks of the period, the Spanish Influenza was caused by an H1N1 strain. Variants of the H1 
and N1 proteins had been present in flu epidemics prior to the birth of this age group, meaning 
that older generation’s immune systems were more likely have antibodies better suited for 
combating the pathogen22. In contrast, young adults lacked the same exposure and therefore an 
immune response, to the H1N1 pandemic strain, causing their immunity against the disease to 
better model an infant23. The large number of deaths in this age group though, coupled with the 
death toll already associated with the first World War, shaped society for the rest of the century 
in a way that often gets ignored.  
 The Spanish Influenza infected people of all races, economic standings, and gender, 
leading to large disruption across social groups.  The most noticeable of these issues stemmed 
from the growing number of orphans due to the influenza outbreak24. Since the majority of those 
who died were between the ages of 18 and 40, many children lost both parents to the disease. 
The rise of orphans forced some children to step up and accept adulthood at a young age, while 
others became wards of their extended family or the state, creating a sense of not-belonging. In 
                                                      
21 Shanks, G Dennis, and John F Brundage. 2012. “Pathogenic Responses among Young Adults 
during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic.” Emerging Infectious Diseases 18 (2): 201–7.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Bristow, Nancy K. 2010. “‘It’s as Bad as Anything Can Be’: Patients, Identity, and the  
Influenza Pandemic.” Public Health Reports (Washington, D.C.: 1974) 125 Suppl (Suppl  
3): 134–44. 
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some families the flu only claimed one parent, forcing the remaining adult to undertake a role not 
normally accepted by society. Widows who primarily stayed home and raised the children joined 
the workforce, or forced their children to do so in their place in an effort to make enough money 
to survive. Single fathers, meanwhile, had to embrace the role of raising children in a society that 
viewed men’s intervention in children’s lives as improper. While a number of state social 
services, heralded by Jane Addams, aimed to reduce the burden these new roles caused for 
families, they remained not fully effective of reducing the stigmatism associated with the 
structure of the family25.  
In the United States during the pandemic period, the 1918 pandemic had it largest effect 
on groups already marginalized by society: African American communities and the poor. 
Throughout most of the 20th century, highly prevalent Jim Crow laws barred many African 
American communities from receiving treatment at more affluent and better staffed hospitals. 
During the 1918 pandemic, these laws allowed for the allocation of resources needed to treat the 
disease and prevent spreading of the virus away from African American hospitals towards more 
affluent white hospitals. By barring African American communities from receiving proper 
treatment during the outbreak, more of those infected succumb to the disease compared to their 
white counterparts. The denial of better care for sick black Americans and the subsequent higher 
death rates was rationalized by white America due to lower infection rates in African American 
communities, strengthening the belief of equality in such treatment26.  
These struggles with inadequate resources to combat the pandemic were further 
hampered by the fact that African American communities tended to be poorer than white ones. 
                                                      
25 Michals, Debra. 2017. “Jane Addams.” National Women’s History Museum.  
26 Ibid. 
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Individuals living at or below the poverty line often experienced greater hardships when trying to 
combat the disease than their wealthier counterparts, regardless of race. Taking time off of work 
to help sick family members often meant losing one’s job, leading to more financial hardship and 
the eventual need for outside aid. While some aid programs attempted to help the poor through 
changing the social systems that contributed to poverty, others blamed individuals for their 
misfortune. In the early 1900’s, eugenics and social Darwinism formed a dominate school of 
thought in the United States and blamed the poor for their misfortune, rather seeing them as dirty 
alcoholics who could not care for themselves or their children. Therefore, even when groups 
supporting eugenics provided aid, it was often at the expense of losing one’s child to the state or 
having to completely build a new life to be deemed “worthy” enough to receive adequate help27.  
These marginalized groups, be it by race or wealth, therefore rarely received the aid they needed 
when facing the pandemic, all while reinforcing stereotypes of both black Americans and the 
poor that persist in our society today.  
The numerous lasting effects that past pandemics have had on national and international 
societies suggest some ways another large-scale pandemic may influence society. While we live 
in a “modern” world, our lives are filled with racism, sexism, and classism. Despite the 
persistence of classifying people based on their attributes, pandemic diseases do not discern these 
differences. Therefore, the rise of such a deadly disease holds the potential to completely rework 
the very intricacies of our current society.  Not picking and choosing who contracts a disease 
does not mean that everyone will experience a pandemic equally. If history is an indicator of the 
future, lower-resourced nations and communities will likely experience the effects of a pandemic 
more severely.  




B: The Changing Threat of Pandemics with Improving Public Health 
 During the 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic, the vast majority of those who died did not 
succumb to their flu symptoms. Rather, most of the deaths associated with the influenza outbreak 
were caused by secondary bacterial infections causing pneumonia28. Pneumonia infections are no 
longer death sentences, though, due to the modern innovation of antibiotics. In 1928, a doctor in 
London discovered that the presence of Penicillium mold inhibits the growth of the bacterium 
Staphyloccous aureus. Following this discovery, researchers at Oxford successfully isolated the 
compounds in the mold which killed a variety of bacterium, and began testing the purified 
sample, named penicillin, on mice29. Penicillin became the first of many commercially available 
antibiotics that have the potential to not only stop infections caused by Staphyloccous aureus, but 
also other bacterium borne diseases including pneumonia and plague.  
 Improvements to vaccines have also aided in limiting disease caused by influenza virus 
infection. Rudimentary vaccines have existed since 1796 when Edward Jenner determined that 
injecting pus caused by cow pox into a young boy provides immunity against small pox, but a 
similar flu vaccine did not exist during the Spanish Influenza pandemic30.  In fact, it was not 
until 1933 when scientists isolated and identified that the microbe causing influenza was a virus, 
that flu vaccine development truly became a large focus of the medical community31.  The first 
flu vaccine was administered to members of the U.S. army in 1945, and has been annually used 
                                                      
28 Shanks. 2012. 
29 Markel, Howard. 2013. “The Real Story Behind Penicillin.” PBS News Hour. 2013.  
30 Stern, Alexandra Minna, and Howard Markel. 2019. “The History of Vaccines and 
Immunization: Familiar Patterns, New Challenges.”  
31 Smith, Wilson, C.H. Andrewes, and P.P. Laidlaw. 1933. “A Virus Obtained from Influenza 
Patients.” The Lancet 222 (5732): 66–68.  
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to vaccinate the general public since 194632. Although the flu vaccine currently requires 
modification each year to prepare for the most prevalent form of influenza in seasonal outbreaks, 
researchers have been investing time and resources into developing a universal vaccine. Such a 
vaccine could provide protection to all strains of influenza that could pass through human 
populations and last for multiple years, fixing the major shortcomings of the currently used 
variant33. 
 Despite improvements in combating infectious diseases, especially when faced with 
influenza outbreaks, these new technological tools do not eliminate the risk of a large-scale 
pandemic that could kill millions. For every step forward the global health community appears to 
take in battling infectious diseases, a new obstacle appears. Although the development of 
antibiotics has helped lower the risk of secondary infections and epidemics caused by bacteria, 
these microbes are gaining resistance to a variety of drugs commonly used as treatment. The rise 
of antibiotic resistance, sped up in part by the overuse and misuse of bacterial killing drugs, has 
created strains of bacteria which are difficult, if not impossible, to kill34. Antibiotic resistant 
bacteria are therefore an emerging global threat, causing over 23,000 deaths a year in the United 
States alone35. The rise of such bacteria therefore increases the risk of wide spread infection and 
death caused by bacterial pathogens such as plague and cholera, and secondary infections often 
seen with influenza outbreaks36.  
                                                      
32 Donnelly, Grace. 2018. “The Flu Shot: Its History and Common Misconceptions | Fortune.” 
Fortune.  
33 Cohen, Jon. 2018. “Universal Flu Vaccine Remains ‘an Alchemist’s Dream’.” Science, 
November. 
34 CDC. “About Antimicrobial Resistance | Antibiotic/Antimicrobial Resistance.” CDC. 2018.  
35 CDC. “CDC Global Health - Infographics - Antibiotic Resistance the Global Threat.” 2018. 
36 Ibid. 
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 Even vaccines, a tool that has been utilized in the prevention of both viruses and bacteria, 
have lost traction in a number of countries. After a successful vaccination campaign leading to 
the eradication of smallpox in 1980, the global health community believed that vaccines were the 
key to stopping all infectious diseases. Smallpox lent itself to eradication not only due to its high 
visibility and short incubation period, but also because humans are the virus’s only host37. These 
aspects of the variolavirus separate smallpox from other diseases, such as polio and measles, that 
continue to persist despite similar eradication efforts38. On top of these intrinsic difficulties with 
eradicating other infectious, difficulties have risen in vaccinating high enough proportions of the 
global population to stop the spread of these viruses. Many diseases that have been targeted for 
eradication remain endemic in regions around the global with weak health care systems, political 
insecurity, and poor sanitation39. Weak health care systems and political insecurity make it 
difficult for the global groups working on eradication to vaccinate the needed percentage of the 
population to make virial transmission of these pathogens impossible40.  
Vaccine rates in countries where these pathogens were once eliminated have also 
decreased. Citing reasons varying from religious beliefs to believing that vaccines cause 
developmental disorders such as autism, certain populations have failed to keep vaccine rates 
high enough to stop once eliminated diseases from reappearing. Resistance to vaccination has 
been especially prevalent in Western countries, such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom, following Andrew Wakefield’s 1998 Lancet paper connecting the development of 
                                                      
37 The College of Physicians of Philadelphia. 2018. “Disease Eradication.” The History of 
Vaccines. 
38 Ibid. 
39 WHO. 2018. “10 Facts on Polio Eradication.” WHO.  
40 GPEI, 2019.  
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autism to receiving the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine41. Although Wakefield’s 
paper has since been retracted, skepticism surrounding the MMR vaccine has remained 
prevalent, causing large outbreaks across the globe in countries where the disease was once 
eliminated42. 
 Establishing vaccination capabilities in areas with systematically healthcare systems and 
the refusing vaccination for non-medical reasons therefore represents some of the largest risks to 
the reemergence of eliminated diseases, and why a large-scale pandemic could still occur43. 
Providing a new universal vaccine to populations already struggling to receive well established 
vaccines may prove difficult, allowing for influenza to persist at high rates in these regions. 44. 
Even if a universal flu vaccine were to be administered at high rates around the globe, pockets of 
resistance against vaccines, especially relatively novel ones, could still allow for highly 
infectious strains of the disease to rapidly spread. It is therefore not unreasonable to observe a 
similar occurrence with a pandemic infectious disease, with certain areas of the world being 
especially hard hit due to low vaccination numbers.  
While low vaccination rates persist as a threat to global health security, they still are a 
lifesaving technology. Vaccines, though, often prove useless during outbreaks of novel viruses 
due to development time following the identification of a new pathogen.  It currently takes ten to 
fifteen year to create and have a vaccine undergo all of its need clinical trials once the agent of a 
                                                      
41 Wakefield, A. J., S. H. Murch, A. Anthony, J. Linnell, D. M. Casson, M. Malik, M. 
Berelowitz, et al. 1998. “Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia, Non-Specific Colitis, and 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children.” Lancet (London, England) 351 (9103): 
637–41.  
42 Hussain, Azhar, Syed Ali, Madiha Ahmed, and Sheharyar Hussain. 2018. “The Anti-
Vaccination Movement: A Regression in Modern Medicine.” Cureus 10 (7): e2919.  
43 WHO. 2019. “Ten Threats to Global Health in 2019.” Emergencies.  
44 Find paper about it being top 10 public health risk 
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disease is first discovered (seasonal flu vaccines not included)45. The emergence of a new 
infectious disease therefore represents a widespread epidemic or pandemic risk due to the severe 
gap in time between the virus spreading and having a vaccine against the pathogen46. This lapse 
in creating and deploying these vaccines would allow highly pathogenic and transmissible 
viruses the time needed to reach pandemic status and possibly kill upwards of 30 million people 
worldwide47. In order to avoid such a global catastrophe such vaccines would already need to be 
in development, or ideally through clinical trial phases. A well-established plan to distribute 
these vaccines also would already need to be in place to ensure that every person have equal 
access to protection from such diseases, regardless of their wealth or where they reside in the 
world. In order to have these pre-established public health protocols and resources, the global 
community must be able to predict possible pandemic diseases, as well as cooperate as in an 
interconnected network to ensure an efficient containment of these pathogens.   
  
Chapter 2: Understanding the Role of Health Organizations in Pandemic Preparedness 
and Response 
 In 1946, the sixty-one members present at the International Health Conference following 
World War II determined that health was a human right48. This decision inspired the creation of 
an international health organization, whose entire purpose was to ensure that good health was an 
international commodity, not just one prevalent in affluent countries. Establishing the World 
Health Organization (WHO) though, is not the first instance of international health cooperation. 
                                                      
45 Association of American Universities. 2010. “Vaccines Today: Faster Than Ever.”  
46 Gupta, Sanjay. 2018. “The Big One Is Coming, and It’s Going to Be a Flu Pandemic - CNN.” 
CNN.  
47 Gates, 2018. 
48 WHO. 2011. “Origin and Development of Health Cooperation.” WHO. 
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In July of 1851 marked the first international discussion focusing on public health was held at the 
International Sanitary Conference in Paris49. Following 1851, International Sanitary Conferences 
began to gain regularity and expanded to tackling infectious diseases commonly associated with 
poor living conditions, such as cholera and plague50. These meetings eventually led to the 
formation of the first international health organization, the Office international d’Hygiène 
publique (OIHP), in 1907. The OIHP was a committee of public health officials from member 
countries who aimed to tackle many of the health issues brought forth during the Sanitary 
Conferences. Following World War I, the League of Nations also formed an international health 
organization, the League of Nations Health Committee and Health Section, which co-existed 
with the OIHP until their eventual merger following the creation of the United Nations and the 
WHO in the mid-1940’s51. 
 Since its formation in 1948, the WHO provides support for its 192-member countries 
around the globe in improving public health52. Many of the WHO efforts, though, have been 
supported by regional, national, and privately funded public health organizations that also hope 
to improve the standard of living for the communities they serve. All four types of public health 
organizations therefore play a role in pandemic preparation and response on a global level. 
Understanding the structure, procedures, and limitations of these groups in response to pandemic 
diseases provides insight into the current state of global health preparedness for a large-scale 
pandemic. I will highlight the different roles and procedures that specific national, regional, and 
privately funded organizations provide in the scope of national and global public health. I will 




52 WHO. 2017. “WHO’s Work with Countries.” WHO. 
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also place these types of organizations in context with the WHO, the single international, 
publicly funded organization that aims to provide the human right of health to the entire globe. 
 
 
A:  National Health: The Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
 Across the globe, a number of publicly funded organizations exist with the main goal of 
predicting, preventing, and responding to disease outbreaks in specific countries. These groups 
are generally publicly funded by a single nation, and work on global health problems that solving 
benefits the organization’s country of origin. Such agencies include the Public Health England 
Centre of Infectious Disease Surveillance and Control (PHE), the Chinese Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United 
States. Although these three organizations vary on protocols, resources, and objectives due to 
their different country’s of origin, understanding one nations program for disease control and 
prevention provides a basic understanding of the role similar national agencies play. Due to the 
United States prominent role in the politics of the international community, especially with their 
dominance in medical technologies and improvement, I will provide specifics on how the CDC 
aids in pandemic preparedness and response.  
Formed in 1946 in Atlanta, Georgia, the CDC originally began under the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services as a program to stop the spread of malaria in the 
United States53. The small program gradually began to take on more challenging problems 
associated with improving public health surrounding communicable diseases in the United 
States, increasing the agencies jurisdiction and budget. The CDC is now one of the highest 
                                                      
53 CDC. 2012. “Our History - Our Story.” About CDC. 2012.  
 21 
funded and well-staffed national health programs and plays a dominate role in improving public 
health around the globe. The CDC approaches infectious diseases and other challenges to public 
health as a security risk with their militaristic mission statement of “working 24/7 to protect 
America from health, safety and security threats, both foreign and in the U.S.”, and has achieved 
these goals by creating three strategic priorities54,55. These priorities, improving health security 
both in the United States and abroad, preventing the leading causes of illness, injury, disability 
and death, and strengthening public health and health care collaboration, have all generated 
funding and programs for preparing against and combating potentially pandemic infectious 
diseases56.  
Currently, the CDC’s largest program focusing on pandemic preparedness is the 
influenza pandemic plan. The first iteration of this plan came out in 2005 following a pandemic 
scare of the highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza strain57. While H5N1 failed to become a 
worldwide pandemic, the CDC continues to update the pandemic influenza plan in anticipation 
of a novel strain with similar capabilities58. The preparedness plan looks to improve influenza 
diagnostic and vaccination technologies, healthcare and scientific infrastructure, communication 
with the public, and communication with the global community59.  Improving monitoring 
systems both in the United States and abroad is particularly stressed in order to identify 
particularly pathogenic strains of influenza before they become pandemic60.  The CDC’s 
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pandemic influenza plan also aids the global monitoring program of influenza headed by the 
WHO61. The agency provides surveillance information surrounding the presence and prevalence 
of different influenza strains in the United States to the international health community and helps 
improve the monitoring stations in fifty other countries62.  
While the preparedness plan has emphasized improvements in technologies and 
surveillance policies focusing on influenza, much of the infrastructure also has uses in preparing 
for possible pandemics caused by other infectious diseases. The systems utilized by the CDC to 
detect influenza circulation in the United States gathers similar information on all diseases 
currently present. Furthermore, the efforts of the CDC, in conjunction with other national health 
organizations including the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID), to 
improve influenza vaccine development and administration has also aided in improvements to 
vaccines of other common pathogens, leading to the elimination of both measles and polio in the 
United States63,64. The CDC has also helped increase vaccination rates against the flu and other 
diseases moving towards elimination by providing information on all vaccines utilized in the 
United States to both health care providers and patients, as well as purchasing and distributing 
required vaccines for underserved children65,66. The agency encourages the continuation of such 
technological advancements by providing a number of grants and cooperative agreements 
focused on vaccine development and distribution67.  
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The CDC also helps strengthen the national defense against pandemics through the 
Global Health Security Agenda by improving disease control and prevention of countries with 
weaker health systems68. The CDC is currently working with thirty-one countries to improve 
disease surveillance and outbreak response, emergency management, diagnostic abilities and safe 
laboratory systems69. These countries achieve these goals through the CDC’s implementation of 
guidelines utilized by countries with successful health care systems, as well as provision of 
technology and resources needed to support said guidelines70. By participating in the Global 
Health Security Agenda, the CDC and the United States government hopes that countries with 
weak health care systems that are at high risk for novel infectious diseases could eventually gain 
the ability to stop the spread of these diseases before they become a public health emergency of 
international concern71.  
The CDC has also been at the forefront of providing vaccines to countries who continue 
to struggle with diseases eliminated in the United States. The CDC’s Global Immunization 
Division (GID) has worked to provide both vaccines and the staff needed to administer the 
medicine to areas of the world where children are at particularly high risk to contract debilitating 
and deadly diseases72. Currently, funds dedicated to the GID have gone primarily into the global 
effort of eradicating polio and eliminating measles and rubella73. By working on these projects 
the GID hopes to also introduce other new underutilized vaccines into immunization programs 
around the world, which could help reduce death in children under five by 40%74. Ideally, the 
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increase of vaccinations will not only stop the spread of currently endemic diseases, but also 
promote acceptance of novel vaccines that could lower the risk of new and emerging pathogens 
from causing epidemics. 
Despite the numerous programs that the CDC maintains and supports to help improve 
public health in both the United States and around the globe, the agency has faced a number of 
setbacks and failures throughout its existence. Most recently, while the CDC has been aiding in 
the global elimination of measles, 2019 has already tallied the second highest number of measles 
infections in the United States since its elimination in 200075. A large reason for this uptick in 
measles infection stems from the spreading of misinformation surrounding the safety of the 
vaccine. Most states in the U.S. allow for vaccination exemption due to religious and/or 
philosophical reasons76. While these loopholes were not largely utilized in the early 2000’s, a 
number of individuals have turned to philosophical exemptions in recent years based off of 
Andrew Wakefield’s redacted 1998 paper linking the development of autism to receiving the 
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine77, 78,79. While the CDC has distributed educational 
information surrounding the safety of the MMR vaccine and encouraged states to deny vaccine 
exemption for philosophical and religious reasons, the growing number of measles cases 
demonstrates just one setback the national agency has experienced80,81,82. 
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The CDC remains just one example of a national public health organization that tackles 
problems surrounding infectious disease control and prevention. Nearly every county has an 
agency that in some way aims to improve the health of its citizens and utilizes techniques to 
control disease spread similar to the CDC. Furthermore, while countries have their own 
organizations aimed at improving the health of their country, that does not mean that these 
groups don’t also provide global aid. The CDC plays a role in a number of the WHO’s initiatives 
such as influenza surveillance and the eradication efforts for vaccine-preventable diseases. 
Regardless of global outreach, though, the CDC and other national health organization 
emphasizes proper support to address the concerns of their country of origin, rather than the 
entire world.  
 
B: Regional Health: The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
 In addition to individual nation’s programs for disease control and prevention, publicly 
funded regional agencies also provide multiple countries support and education with preventing 
and combating infectious diseases. Such organizations, though, are far less common compared to 
nationally run programs, due to the need for cooperation between nations83,84. The two largest 
and most established iterations of this regional model of disease control and prevention is the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the Pan-America Health 
Organization (PAHO). The PAHO provides technical support and coordinates cooperation 
between its fifty-two-member nations across North and South America to prevent and control 
diseases, strengthen health systems, and respond to health emergencies and disasters85. The 
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PAHO acts as both an independent organization that aims to improve public health in the Pan-
American region, as well as the regional office of the America’s for the WHO. Due to its duel 
function, funding for the PAHO comes from both its member countries and the WHO. In 
contrast, the ECDC only pulls funding from its member states, functioning independently from 
the WHO. The ECDC works with and receives funding from all European Union (EU) and 
European Economic Area countries to respond to public health threats and emerging diseases 
both in Europe and abroad86. Due to its funding being all internally based (i.e. not from other 
WHO nations such as the PAHO) I will present the ECDC as an example of regionally based 
public health organizations. 
Compared to many nationally run public health organizations and the globally run WHO, 
the ECDC is relatively new. The ECDC was first voted on in 2004, when the member nations of 
the EU determined that Europe was lacking the disease control and prevention infrastructure that 
many similarly wealthy nations had in place87. The ECDC began operation in June of 2005, and 
aims to “identify, assess, and communicate current and emerging threats to human health posed 
by infectious diseases”88,89. The current focus of the ECDC remains on improving and 
developing new technologies for disease surveillance and early warning systems for fifty-two 
communicable diseases across Europe90.  
With their focus on disease surveillance and prevention across all member states, the 
ECDC has organized a number of disease programs aimed to address the varying pathogens that 
                                                      
86 Ibid. 
87 Greer, Scott. 2012. “The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control: Hub or Hollow 
Core?” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 27 (6): 1001–30.  
88 ECDC. 2019. “ECDC’s Mission.” About Us. 
89 The Lancet Infectious Diseases. 2008. “Strengthening Infectious Disease Surveillance in 
Europe.” The Lancet Infectious Diseases 8 (9): 525. 
90 ECDC. 2019. “ECDC’s Mission.” About Us. 
 27 
threaten Europe’s security. These programs aim to not only provide up-to-date information about 
different disease risks, but also provides tools to combat said pathogens91. Currently, the ECDC 
funds eight disease programs, which ranges from public health microbiology to emerging and 
vector borne diseases. Furthermore, like the CDC, the ECDC also has a program focused on 
providing information surrounding vaccines and improving their safety92. Despite parallel 
initiatives associated with their programs, the ECDC differs from the CDC due to its more 
limited scope. While the CDC plays a major role in improving the preparedness for novel 
diseases of countries on every continent, the ECDC mainly focuses on improving the health care 
system of their member states. Despite these limitations, though, the ECDC has engaged with the 
global health community when approaching a number of diseases declared as public health 
emergencies of international concern93.  
 Since its formation, the ECDC has already provided resources for two large global health 
crises: the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 and the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic. Due to the 
relative infancy of the agency compared to other organization that play a large role in global 
health such the WHO and the CDC, though, the ECDC lagged in providing ample expertise, 
resources, and general numbers during these crises94,95. The 2009-2010 H1N1 influenza outbreak 
served as the first pandemic the ECDC was forced to confront following its formative years. 
Although the agency provided adequate risk assessment on the virus in the Europe, it failed to 
coordinate the purchase and distribution of vaccines and antiviral medicines against the 
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pathogen96. A large reason for the agency’s inadequacies in providing support to the politically 
contentious issues, such as vaccine purchases, stems from the structure of the organization97,98.  
While it was well acknowledged the program was still quite young, the limitations set on the 
ECDC has inhibited the program from being a key player in the response to infectious diseases99. 
These restrictions include the relatively small budget of the ECDC of forty million euros, as well 
as the presence of less than 300 employees across all member states100.   
In order to better serve the member states of the ECDC, the agency’s budget has been 
raised to nearly fifty-nine million euros101. Through the provision of more funding, the 
organization has effectively played a larger role in responding to both epidemics and pandemics 
on a global scale. Specifically, they have expanded and improved upon their capabilities to 
provide much needed diagnostic technology during the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic102. 
Despite these improvements, though, the resources of the ECDC still remain inadequate for 
being a point organization in addressing an epidemic or pandemic outbreak103,104. Although 
improvements have been made to the ECDC’s budget, it still lacks in comparison to other 
nationally based organizations such as the CDC, who currently has a budget of over seven billion 
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U.S. dollars105. Furthermore, the number of employees for the ECDC still remains below 300 for 
all of Europe106. In comparison, the CDC has over 12,000 health care workers, providing 
services both internally and abroad107.  
Despite these shortcomings the ECDC remains an organization that many public health 
officials feel has yet to achieve its full potential108. The ECDC has the backing of fifty-two 
countries, a number of which are fairly wealthy, providing the agency with the opportunity to 
eventually gain the funding and employee base needed to become more influential in global 
public health. Furthermore, the inclusion of multiple countries funding and interacting with the 
ECDC gives the agency more input and resources to solve problems surrounding infectious 
diseases compared to national organizations. While the WHO serves more countries than the 
ECDC, the smaller member size of the regional agency allows the ECDC to address problems 
that are more prevalent to its member states in the European region. The ECDC and other 
regional disease control and prevention organizations can therefore provide broader aid than 
national programs, but more focused to regional health problems than the WHO.  
 
C: Non-Government Organizations: Médecins Sans Frontières 
 In contrast to the organizations like the CDC and the ECDC, a number of agencies that 
are privately funded also provide resources for combating infectious disease. Such groups, 
including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, CARE International, and Médecins Sans 
Frontières/ Doctors without Borders (MSF), gather funds either through personal assets or 
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donations from both individuals and a variety of governments around the globe109. Like the 
publicly funded global health groups, these organizations aim to provide resources for combating 
infectious diseases in areas of the world that are most at risk. Furthermore, while government-run 
global health organizations make changes through creating and then enacting different policies, 
these non-government groups provide a more hands on approach to combating infectious disease 
and its impact to global health. Médecins Sans Frontières has been one of the leading non-
government organizations in providing medical assistance to combat local epidemics and 
pandemics, and will therefore serve as the main example of what non-government organizations 
(NGOs) focused on public health bring to protecting the global community against infectious 
disease. 
 Médecins Sans Frontières was formed in 1971 in Paris, France following the famine and 
subsequent war that broke out Biafra, Nigeria110. Since its charter, the organization has grown 
from 300 volunteer doctors, nurses, and other staff based in France, to over 42,000 workers 
worldwide111. Médecins Sans Frontières main goal since its formation has remained providing 
medical care to whoever is in need throughout the globe, without thought to the effected group(s) 
race, political views, or religious convictions112. Due to their belief that global health is a right 
that transcends all other aspects of an individual, MSF remains politically, economically, and 
religiously unaffiliated113. Such structure has put MSF on the front lines of global health crisis 
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ranging from local epidemics, to providing medical care in areas effected by war or natural 
disaster114.  
 In terms of combating epidemic and pandemics diseases, MSF has provided a number of 
services to countries most susceptible to large outbreaks of certain pathogens due to location and 
poor public health systems. Médecins Sans Frontières focuses both on short term public health 
crisis, as well as long term inefficiencies in the public health of different regions115. Their short-
term efforts generally focus on providing immediate medical care for those in need and 
informing the global community of the current situation that MSF is encountering116. While these 
projects generally last only as long as the crisis is prevalent, MSF also undertakes long-term 
projects that sometimes requires the presence of the organization for decades117. Such long-term 
efforts generally begin as short-term projects that lend themselves to MSF staying to either set up 
or improve the health care systems of the community in need118. By undertaking these two 
distinct length projects, MSF therefore provides immediate response to infectious diseases 
outbreaks and plays a role in global pandemic preparedness.  
 While MSF remains unaffiliated to any country, political identity, or religious group, the 
organization does interact with and contribute to global preparedness and response to infectious 
disease outbreaks. During the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic, MSF doctors were some of the 
first health care providers to come in contact with EVD patients and alerted the global public 
health system of the growing threat the then unknown disease had to Guinea119. Médecins Sans 
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Frontières has also aided the global vaccination effort supported by the WHO against 
preventable diseases in countries with weaker healthcare systems120.  
 Multiple other NGO’s also contribute to infectious disease control and prevention, as 
well as provides on the ground services to medical emergencies in underprepared countries. A 
number of these groups, though, do not maintain the neutrality observed by MSF, leading to 
more selective services being provided to those in need121, 122. Despite these discrepancies in who 
receives aids from the NGOs, a large number of these groups do provide effective aid in 
preparing for and combating infectious diseases123. Non-government organizations therefore play 
an imperative role in global infectious disease and pandemic preparedness, and must therefore be 
addressed when improving current systems of disease control and prevention. 
   
D: International Health: The World Health Organization 
 In contrast to national and regional public health organizations, only one publicly funded 
agency’s goal is overall global security from infectious diseases. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) is currently the only publicly funded international health organization that includes 
members from every continent (excluding Antarctica). The organization aims to provide 
knowledge and support to every member country through its international headquarters and its 
six regional offices (the Americas, Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Mediterranean, and 
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Western Pacific)124. Pre-dated by the League of Nations Health Organization and the OIHP, a 
unified public health program was suggested during the 1945 conference setting up the United 
Nations125. At this formative meeting, founding members of the United Nations declared health a 
human right, and therefore made it the goal of this new organization to holistically improve 
global public health, not just focus on sanitation as its predecessors126. In the years following the 
first meeting, a constitution for this public health agency, known as the World Health 
Organization, was created and then ratified by members of the United Nations on April 7th, 
1948127,128. Since its creation in 1948, the WHO has strived to provide the highest standard of 
health to people all over the globe, which has included helping contain and treat both epidemic 
and pandemic diseases throughout the past seventy years129.  
 With advancements in both public health knowledge, as well as with technologies, the 
WHO has continued to change throughout the past seventy years, expanding their responsibilities 
and resources provided to aid in public health initiatives130. In terms of infectious disease, the 
WHO has been a major force behind the eradication efforts of smallpox, polio, and measles 
among other maladies, providing both technical training and supplies for worldwide vaccinations 
against these diseases131. Most importantly, though, the WHO has been the main organization to 
mobilize international funds and resources for dealing with public health concerns across the 
globe, especially in countries with weaker economies and health care infrastructures.   
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 In 2005, the first iteration of the International Health Regulations (IHR) was adopted by 
the 196 countries in association with the WHO (192-member nations plus four others)132. These 
regulations represent an agreement between all signed countries to collaboratively work towards 
global health security by improving individual nations ability to detect, assess, and report on 
diseases and making all data gathered public133. In making said improvements, the WHO plays a 
role in coordinating these efforts, working with partners to help raise funds, distribute 
technologies, and provide knowledge surrounding improving global health security134. The 
creation of the IHR also provided the WHO with power when responding to infectious disease 
outbreaks that officials view as public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC)135. 
Public Health Emergencies of International Concerns are decided by a WHO committee based 
on the risk that an infectious disease poses of spreading internationally and whether a 
coordinated international response is required136. Declaring a PHEIC allows the WHO to directly 
assess the problem unfolding in the affected regions and respond accordingly by freeing up funds 
from both the organization and other member nations to properly respond to the crisis at hand137. 
Since enacting the IHR in 2007 only four PHEIC’s have been declared, demonstrating the 
gravity of such a declaration has on the public health community138. 
 In addition to meeting the guidelines issued in the IHR, the WHO also works on five 
other priorities to improve global health security, including noncommunicable diseases and 
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increasing access to medical products139. These priorities were redefined and strategic plans to 
achieve these goals were improved upon in 2014 following backlash of the WHO’s response to 
the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic140. This restructuring of the system has provided the WHO 
with more funding when responding to PHEIC’s by the World Bank, as well as inspired a 
restructuring of the agencies response system to public health problems in order to better serve 
countries and communities in need141. 
 Despite critiques of the WHO following its responses to a number of public health global 
security threats, the agency remains the best line of defense against infectious diseases and 
possible pandemics. The organization combines the expertise of thousands of professionals who 
are the top of their field when it comes to responding to disease outbreaks, providing the entire 
globe access to such knowledge142. This cooperation through the WHO towards global health 
provides much needed help in improving the health care and response systems in countries that 
through war, exploitation, or a combination of both have lagged behind the technological 
capabilities of nations like the United States. The WHO, though, fails to provide direct 
intervention, as well as the focused knowledge of a nation’s history and relationship with public 
health. Other national, regional, and NGO’s therefore help fill the holes formed by the WHO’s 
broad approach to infectious disease and prevention. 
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Chapter 3: The 2014 West Africa Ebola Epidemic: Failures of Predicting Pandemics and 
the International Response 
Although numerous organizations combat infectious diseases, their interventions 
inadequately approach the threat that these viruses pose to global security, failing to stop 
outbreaks of these diseases. Part of the global health community’s current struggles with 
stopping disease outbreaks may stem from the shift observed in how nations address the risks 
posed by infectious disease. Throughout history, infectious diseases were primarily viewed as 
threats to the security of armed forces143.  In 2007, though, the WHO asserted that infectious 
diseases also threaten the political and economic stability of individual countries and the 
world144. While the threat that these pathogens have on the fabrics of society have existed for 
more than the past twelve years, this deceleration led to a shift in how preventing infectious 
diseases were approached by the global community. Instead of focusing on the global aspect of 
the novel threats that these pathogens posed, many countries continued to look inwards to 
improve national programs focused on surveillance, prevention, and treatment. By turning 
inwards in addressing the threat of infectious diseases, richer countries have vastly improved 
their ability to prepare for and respond to disease outbreaks. Less affluent countries, though, 
have been left on their own to face the threat of infectious diseases without the funds or 
technology that aided their richer counterparts.  
West Africa has long been a hot spot for tropical infectious diseases such as malaria, 
dengue, yellow fever, and Lassa fever. Many of these diseases are caused by viral infections that 
spill over from animal hosts into humans and have garnered billions of dollars in research due to 
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their high mortality rates145,146. Following 9/11, hemorrhagic fever diseases including yellow and 
Lassa fever gained the attention of the United States due to fears that these pathogens could be 
turned into biological weapons for terror attacks. During the Cold War, Lassa virus represents 
just one virus manipulated by the Soviet Union and the United States into an aerosol weapon, 
fueling the belief similar virus could again be weaponized147. Currently, Lassa fever is endemic 
in the Mano River Union (MRU) region of West Africa, encouraging the United States to 
conduct research into the hemorrhagic fever and other viruses in the region that could be 
weaponized. 
First identified in 1969, Lassa fever is a hemorrhagic fever with symptoms similar to 
Ebola and yellow fever, that spreads through contact with the multimammate rat and human 
bodily fluids148. Unlike other viral hemorrhagic viruses, Lassa fever is endemic in West Africa, 
infecting hundreds of thousands of people in the region annually. Due to its ease in transmission, 
and the ability to create an aerosol of the virus during the Cold War, Lassa fever was declared a 
Category A agent with bioterrorism potential by the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) following 9/11149. The worries of this disease being used as a 
bioterrorist weapon, and possibly causing a highly fatal pandemic, encouraged funding from the 
National Institute of Health (NIH) towards establishing the Lassa Diagnostic Laboratory in the 
Kenema Government Hospital of Sierra Leone150. Built in 2005, this lab tests blood samples of 
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patients suspected to have Lassa fever for diagnosis, as well as sends collected specimens for 
more in depth analysis by agencies based in the United States151. Gathering of such samples has 
helped the U.S. gain a better understanding of the disease in preperation for a large-scale 
epidemic or bioterrorist event. Research efforts into Lassa fever in the MRU region, though, 
failed to predict the real danger lurking in West Africa: Ebola. 
 
A: An Overview of Ebola Virus Disease 
 First identified in in 1976, Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a hemorrhagic fever caused by 
the infection of a group of viruses from ebolavirus genus within the Filoviridae family. A 
zoonotic disease, EVD in humans initially presents similarly to other common illnesses such as 
malaria, Lassa fever, and influenza, with symptoms including fever, fatigue, diarrhea, and 
vomiting. As the disease progresses, though, more serve symptoms such as impaired kidney and 
liver functions, as well as internal and external hemorrhaging often occur. Due to the common 
delay in correctly diagnosing EVD, especially at the beginning of an outbreak, the average 
fatality rate of EVD is around 50%. Mortality rates in isolated epidemics, though, have ranged 
between 25% and 90% depending on the virus species and the presence of early supportive 
care152. While highly lethal, EVD transmission requires contact with infected bodily fluids. 
Education on Ebola coupled with the usage of proper personal protective equipment (PPE) when 
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dealing with the virus has therefore allowed for most outbreaks to register case counts below one 
hundred153.  
 Ebolavirus is zoonotic in origin, meaning humans are not the natural reservoir for the 
virus, and therefore infection occurs through interaction with other animals who either act as a 
reservoir or carrier. The primary sources of human-Ebola contact occur by residing near 
previously infected nonhuman primates, or through interactions and consumption of fruit bats, 
the probable reservoir of ebolavirus154. Currently, six species in the genus ebolavirus are known, 
four of which have caused human EVD. While the disease was previously known by 
communities in central Africa, EVD caught the attention of the international community 
following an outbreak of “a novel hemorrhagic fever” near the Ebola River in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC, formally Zaire) in 1976. This outbreak resulted in 318 cases and 
280 deaths, and was linked to a filamentous virus named Zaire ebolavirus155. A similar outbreak 
around the same time was later noted in South Sudan (formally Sudan), but with a lower number 
of cases and death (284 and 151 respectively)156. While initially thought to have stemmed from 
the DRC outbreak, analysis demonstrated that the disease in South Sudan was caused by a 
distinct virion of the same genus named Sudan ebolavirus.  Since 1976, two other types of 
ebolavirus, Bundibugyo ebolavirus, and Taï Forest ebolavirus, have caused human EVD, with 
the former being implicated in number of larger outbreaks, while the latter has only caused one 
                                                      
153 CDC. 2018. “What Is Ebola Virus Disease? | Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease) | CDC.” 2018. 
154 WHO. “Ebola Virus Disease.” 2018. 
155 J. Burke, R. Declerq, and G. Ghysebrechts. 1978. “Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Zaire, 1976.  
Report of an International Commission.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization. Vol. 
56. 1978;56(2):271-293. 
156 WHO. “Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Sudan, 1976 Report of a WHO/International Study  
Team 1.” n.d. Vol. 56. 1978;56(2):247-270. 
 40 
known case. The remaining two species, Reston ebolavirus and Bombali ebolavirus, do not cause 
human EVD, but Reston does cause EVD in pigs and other nonhuman primates157. 
Prior to 2014, all naturally occurring outbreaks of human EVD emerged from the rural 
tropical rain forest regions of Central and Eastern Africa, except for the one reported case of Taï 
Forest ebolavirus from Côte d’Ivoire in 1994158. Furthermore, in all twenty-three non-lab 
outbreaks of EVD between 1976 and 2014 less than 450 cases were reported, with the 1976 DRC 
outbreak totaling the largest death toll159. Public health officials and locals were therefore 
unaware of ebolaviruses ability to transmit in West Africa from a non-human source, and failed 
to predict that EVD outbreaks could grow to the size of the 2014 epidemic in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea.  
 
B: An Overview of the 2014 West Africa Ebola Epidemic 
In December 2013, a young boy in rural Guinea fell ill of a disease with an unknown 
origin causing fever, black stool, and vomiting. Two days later he died160. Quickly after the 
passing of the eighteen-month-old boy, later identified as Emile Ouamouno, his immediate 
family began showing similar symptoms of this unknown plague. As more fell ill, including a 
family friend from Sierra Leone, those infected began to travel between towns and neighboring 
countries, spreading the disease. Those ill also began seeking medical care beyond traditional 
healers, going to clinics and hospitals which allowed for the swift spread of the disease from the 
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rural forests of Guinea into more urban areas such as Conakry161. By March of 2014, the 
outbreak had reached neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia with a mortality rate of 90%162.  
Despite all of this, the exact virus responsible for the deadly outbreak remained unknown and the 
communities in these countries had not been alerted to the growing problem. The breakdown in 
communication between government officials and citizens of these countries likely stemmed 
from the MRU region being endemic to a number of hemorrhagic fevers, excluding Ebola163. 
Many health officials therefore displayed ignorance towards properly identifying this virus, 
which not only lead to dissemination of improper information, but also contributed to the poor 
containment and treatment provided, increasing both Ebola’s spread and mortality rate.  
 It was not until March 13th, 2014 that the Guinean government’s Ministry of Health first 
alerted the national and international communities of the growing unknown threat, over three 
months since the outbreak began164. Following the announcement, the Ministry of Health 
supported by MSF and the WHO African Regional Office (WHO AFRO) undertook an 
investigation into diagnosing the exact disease causing such a lethal outbreak. By April of 2014 
they discovered the culprit: EVD caused by Zaire ebolavirus, the deadliest strain of the known 
EVD causing viruses in humans165. 
Even with a name to the disease and a protocol established to minimize the spread of 
EVD across Western Africa, cases continued to occur. The health, cultural, and political 
infrastructures of the Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia were ill equipped to handle such an 
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outbreak alone. The disease began to spread to other countries as well, and not just by traveling 
on foot. Airplanes flying to international cities contained passengers already infected with EVD, 
some even growing symptomatic, and therefore contagious, on the flights166. EVD successfully 
made its way not only to nearby Nigeria, Mali, and Senegal through this method of travel, but 
also into the Global North167. By August 2014, the WHO declared the current Ebola epidemic in 
West Africa a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), providing technical 
guidance and assistance to the area and emphasizing the need for a coordinated international 
response to curb the growing problem168. 
Following the PHEIC, the international community responded with donations from 
countries around the globe, including Cuba, China, the United States, and Great Britain, for 
treatment centers, as well as the training and deployment of doctors, nurses, and epidemiologists 
into the affected regions169, 170. The aid supplied to Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia helped to 
eventually declare these regions Ebola free. Liberia was the first country to reach said status in 
January of 2016, with Sierra Leone quickly following suit171. Guinea, though, did not successful 
stop the spread of EVD until June of 2016, two and a half years after the initial case was 
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discovered. During that time, over 28,000 cases of Ebola were reported, with 11,325 of them 
resulting in death172.  
 
C: Slow International Response Rate in 2014 Epidemic Highlights Current Inefficiencies in the 
Epidemic and Pandemic Response Worldwide 
 Prior to 2014, an outbreak of EVD had never reported more than 450 cases173. The 
explosion of cases seen in the West Africa epidemic, though, demonstrated the very real threat 
that infectious diseases have on an increasingly more urban world, and the need for fast response 
times. Failing to identify ebolavirus as the disease-causing pathogen during the first four months 
of the outbreak allowed the virus to spread unchecked to urban areas of Guinea, as well as 
surrounding Sierra Leone and Liberia, and simultaneously hinder effective treatment of the 
disease. While wealthier countries have health systems capable of both identifying infectious 
diseases in early stages of an outbreak and reducing the spread of the pathogen, Liberia, Guinea, 
and Sierra Leone lacked the appropriate resources to combat an infectious disease outbreak due 
to centuries of exploitation by colonial powers174. These three effected countries therefore relied 
heavily on the international community for aid in combating ebolavirus. While NGOs such as 
MSF were quick to provide medical services to the area, the slow mobilization of the WHO and 
other government funded organizations following identification of ebolavirus further hurt 
containment efforts of the pathogen and exposed just how underprepared the world is when 
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facing large scale infectious disease outbreaks. The failures in containing the West Africa Ebola 
epidemic, though, has provided public health officials with a starting place when trying to 
identify the world’s weak spots when it comes to infectious disease preparedness.  
 The slow response time between the epidemic’s start and identifying the viral threat as 
ebolavirus made the West Africa Ebola epidemic not only the largest EVD outbreak ever 
observed in humans, but was also the longest. Despite the lag in identifying the pathogen 
responsible for the epidemic, both detection and diagnostic technologies for ebolavirus had been 
readily employed since its discovery 1976175. By 2014, real-time reverse transcriptase 
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays and enzyme-linked immunosorbent serological 
assays (ELISA) were the most the commonly employed techniques, first gaining prominence as 
diagnostic tools of ebolavirus in the early 2000’s176. While utilizing these techniques requires at 
least a makeshift laboratory, something that Guinea and Liberia lacked, Sierra Leone was already 
home to a powerful diagnostic facility at the Kenema Government Hospital177.  
Kenema Government Hospital is home of the Lassa fever diagnostic center, a United 
States funded laboratory that has the capabilities of analyzing blood samples for the presence of 
viral pathogens as a diagnostic test178. Between 500-700 patients annually from surrounding 
MRU countries submit blood samples searching for a diagnosis to their aliment. While Kenema 
has the technologies to diagnose Lassa fever, 60% of patients never receive a diagnosis despite 
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showing symptoms of a hemorrhagic fever179. The lack of actually diagnosing patients stems 
from the hospital only checking for lassavirus and ignoring other endemic hemorrhagic fever 
viruses in the region, such as yellow fever virus180. Retroactive studies of these blood samples, 
though, demonstrated that a number of these undiagnosed cases were caused by ebolavirus, 
putting the pathogen in the region as early as 2006181. Both the Kenema Government Hospital 
and the United States therefore had the ability to identify ebolavirus as present in the MRU 
region at least eight years prior to the epidemic. By focusing too narrowly on expected pathogens 
instead of viruses that could survive in a region, the global community demonstrated their 
limitations in actively predicting and preventing disease outbreaks.  
 While the 2014 Ebola epidemic demonstrated the current weaknesses in predicting 
epidemics and pandemics on a global level, it more importantly showed the inadequacies in the 
global community’s response to public health emergencies. The health infrastructure of all three 
MRU countries were highly underdeveloped prior to the 2014 epidemic182. The global 
community had taken notice of the weak health detection capabilities in these MRU countries 
during the 2005 WHO’s International Health Regulations, but placed the burden of improving 
these systems primarily on the effected countries183.  The political and economic climates of all 
three countries, though, remained too weak to actually put any of these recommended 
improvements into their health systems184. Sierra Leone and Liberia saw civil wars end in 2002 
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and 2003 respectively, leaving both countries in the midst of rebuilding a politically and 
economically stable climate during the years leading up to the Ebola epidemic185,186. Guinea, 
while not actively engaged in a war during the 21st century, was still experiencing civil unrest 
due to years of exploitation by mining and timber companies across the country187. The political 
instability present in all three countries therefore contributed to a lack of internal funding 
towards improving health systems and for the majority of international aid to go towards 
rebuilding other infrastructure vital to improve a countries economy and political stability188. 
Funneling money into programs that aided the political climate helped stabilize the MRU 
countries leading up the epidemic, but the health care and public health infrastructure of the three 
countries failed to observe such growths. Rather, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia continued to 
spend over four times less on health care compared to the global average189. All three countries 
health care systems were therefore too weak to provide impactful treatment against EVD and 
contributed to the virus’s spread. Even in the early months of the outbreak when an endemic 
hemorrhagic fever was suspected, efficient treatment lacked despite many of the symptoms and 
the human-to-human transmission remaining the same as EVD190. Therefore, as with all viral 
hemorrhagic fevers, doctors and caretakers of the sick were highly recommended to wear 
personal protective equipment (PPEs) when treating patients to minimize contact with bodily 
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fluids191. A weak health care system, though, meant that most hospitals were underfunded and 
lacked PPEs, putting health care providers at high risk of contracting the virus192. Furthermore, 
the number of hospitals and doctors in the region were also low due to years of civil wars and 
unrest pre-dating the epidemic in all three countries193. Therefore, many family members and 
traditional healers without any access to PPEs were the best option to provide treatment to the 
sick, while running a high risk of contracting the disease themselves194. These systematic 
weakness in the healthcare system help contribute to the quick spread of the virus throughout the 
region. 
The MRU countries poor health infrastructure, coupled by the international community’s 
lack of guidance towards funding and establishing the health systems of these nations led to 
more losses than the 11,000 lives to ebolavirus. The 2014 epidemic also had long term effects on 
the globes health care system, as well as the economics and social fabrics of Sierra Leone, 
Libera, and Guinea195,196,197,198. By the end of 2015 over 5.1 billion United States dollars in funds 
had been allotted to helping contain the spread of EVD and provide treatment to the sick199. The 
majority of this funding came as donations from WHO-member countries and the World Bank to 
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both the WHO and the affected countries200. Although declaring a PHEIC provided the WHO 
access to some funds and resources, no emergency fund had previously been established to deal 
with an epidemic of this magnitude201.  Rather, countries where PHEIC’s have previously been 
declared had enough resources and a healthy enough economy that technological support and 
minimal funding from the WHO was sufficient in combating these infectious diseases202. The 
economies of Sierra Leone, Libera, and Guinea, though, were much weaker due to centuries of 
exploitation by the Global North, civil unrest, and recent wars in Sierra Leone and Libera203. 
These economies were therefore underprepared to deal with such an epidemic, resulting in a loss 
of over 2.2 billion dollars of GDP between the three countries despite these donations204. Such a 
blow to these economies further destabilized the already delicate political climate of the MRU 
countries and reversed the growing economy observed pre-outbreak.  
While the poor health care infrastructure of the three MRU countries played a large role 
in the economic loss experienced by the 2014 epidemic, many public health officials feel that 
these losses, and the deaths of thousands, are largely due to the WHO’s late and bordering 
inefficient intervention205, 206, 207. The WHO had stated in 2005 that all countries included on the 
IHR needed effective detection infrastructure for infectious diseases, yet Guinea’s ability to 
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detect viral outbreaks in 2014 remained too weak to provide an early response to the disease208. 
The lack of complying to the mandated detection service in Guinea represents the failure of the 
WHO to properly support its member nations. While a number of WHO nation-states are rich 
enough to constantly reimagine their disease detection systems and improve upon those of other 
countries, less affluent members are expected to meet the standards of these richer countries 
without proper resources209. One of the WHO’s largest function is to provide technical support to 
address public health issues and mobilize funds from other nation states to respond to 
emergencies210. By failing to provide the needed expertise and funding to Guinea prior to the 
2014 epidemic, the WHO inadvertently allowed for EVD to spread throughout the country for 
over three months before detection. 
Even once the spread of a then unknown disease was reported by Guinea’s Ministry of 
Health and MSF workers stationed in the area due to malaria outbreaks, the WHO was slow to 
respond. By the time that ebolavirus was identified as the disease-causing pathogen in late 
March of 2014, the virus had already registered sporadic cases to the capital cities of all three 
MRU countries211. Despite EVD reaching multiple capital cities, something unseen in other 
outbreaks of the virus, the WHO continued to describe the outbreak as “relatively small”, much 
to the vocal disagreement of MSF officials in the region212. The WHO disregard to the growing 
Ebola outbreak persisted for another four months, even as the disease began to sustain 
transmission in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea and MSF continued to demand international 
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aid213,214. It was not until July of 2014, when a number of international organizations including 
the World Bank, began heading the warnings from MSF and donating both funds and supplies to 
curb the disease spread215. With the larger international community beginning to engage with the 
outbreak, an International Health Relegations Emergency Committee was formed by the WHO 
in early August, and subsequently declared a PHEIC216. 
These steps towards helping the affected MRU countries, though, came a little a too late. 
By the time the international community began to provide adequate aid, thousands of individuals 
had already contracted ebolavirus, and the disease was beginning to spread to countries outside 
of the MRU region and the continent of Africa217. The WHO and the rest of the international 
community involved in the outbreak now had a larger task ahead of them to stop the spread of 
the disease compared to if intervention had occurred earlier. The failure to contain the outbreak 
for another eighteen months after the declaration of PHEIC, as well as the multiple false 
declarations of countries being ebolavirus free demonstrates the difficulties that the WHO and 
associated organizations faced in truly gaining control of the outbreak218,219.  
The international community’s failure to listen to present MSF workers, as well as 
ignoring the novel aspects of the outbreak, demonstrates major weakness in the global response 
to infectious disease outbreaks. The WHO is supposed to provide aid and technical services to 
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countries struggling with public health problems, yet they failed to adequately address the 
weaknesses in the MRU regions health system both prior to and during the Ebola epidemic. The 
health care infrastructure of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Libera had long demonstrated 
inefficiencies in responding to public health emergencies prior to 2014, yet the growing threat of 
a pathogen previously unknown to the region failed to garner aid from the WHO. While the 
global health community has called for a restructuring of the WHO in terms of epidemic 
response, it also should require the WHO to reanalyze its treatment of members states. While the 
WHO may currently provide equal aid to member countries, the organization should instead look 
for equity by being quicker to respond to even small disease outbreaks in nations with weak 
health care systems to avoid repeating the 2014 epidemic.  
 
Chapter 4: The Threat of H5N1: Molecular Modifications as a Predictive Tool 
 The slow response and subsequent containment of the 2014 Ebola epidemic by the 
international community resulted in the unnecessary infection of hundreds, if not thousands, of 
people in Western Africa. While these failures have spurred a change in how international 
community responds to highly lethal and infectious diseases and a restructuring of the WHO, 
these policies fail to truly address how unprepared the world continues to be for an epidemic of a 
known disease. The inability to properly asses the dangers of a disease that has existed in human 
populations for over forty years reflects poorly on the international communities’ ability predict 
the next large epidemic, let alone pandemic. The failures with predicting the West Africa Ebola 
epidemic also sparks concerns about a new infectious disease appearing in humans. While the 
majority of new zoonotic diseases rarely become more than an epidemic, rising global and urban 
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populations means that these new outbreaks could become more severe than previously 
observed.  
The appearance and spread of SARS in 2002 highlight the risk of new diseases appearing 
in more urban areas, allowing for easier spread throughout the globe. The first chain of SARS 
transmission occurred in Fosham City, China, a metropolitan area home to more than seven 
million people220. Within four months, the disease had spread to Hong Kong, and quickly 
accrued cases in 28 other countries across every continent but Antarctica221. In contrast, the first 
outbreak of Ebola appeared and stayed in the rural villages of the DRC’s Bumba Zone222. The 
shift in new infectious diseases appearing not in these rural areas, but now highly urban ones, 
presents the threat of a pathogen with pandemic potential spreading around the world quicker 
than the international community can respond. The likelihood of this fear becoming a reality 
with our growing populations emphasizes the need to predict currently epizootic disease, which 
may turn pandemic in humans. H5N1 represents one such virus currently circulating through 
numerous bird populations in Southeast Asia with known capabilities to infect humans, but 
rarely sustains human to human transmission. Fears of a human transmissible airborne strain 
mutating, though, has prompted monitoring programs for H5N1 as an attempt to predict if and 
when the virus mutates to become a pandemic risk. 
 
A: An Overview of H5N1 
In 1996, a novel, highly pathogenic strain of influenza was isolated in a farmed goose 
from China. Less than a year later this strain, H5N1, made its first jump to humans, infecting 18 
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people and killing 6 of them in Hong Kong223. As the world entered the 21st century, though 
H5N1 went from just a rare species of influenza that occasionally infects humans, to a pandemic 
threat. Late in 2003, countries across Southeast Asia began reporting H5N1 outbreaks among 
poultry. During this time no human cases were associated with the disease due to the SARS 
outbreak which was also concurrently affecting the region. It was not until 2006 that a number of 
deaths associated with SARS between late 2003 and early 2004 in China and Viet Nam were 
correctly attributed to H5N1224. As 2004 progressed more and more countries in the region began 
reporting outbreaks of the virus in their poultry, spurring people in close contact with the sick 
birds to get tested for H5N1. Many of those exposed to the sick birds fell ill across Asia, with 
over 60% of the sick eventually succumbing to the disease225. The high mortality rate of H5N1 
made the later discoveries of apparent transmission between family members of the virus more 
concerning, suggesting that the virus mutated to allow for easier human-to-human transmission.  
From 2004 until 2006, 263 confirmed cases of H5N1 were confirmed in fifteen countries 
spanning North America, Africa, and Asia, with a mortality rate of 60%226. Luckily, despite 
earlier fears of human to human transmission of the disease, the interactions needed for the virus 
to spread were only observed in immediate blood relatives, suggesting extremely close and 
prolonged proximity to the infected for transmission227. The drop in new cases in 2007 further 
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proved this fact, with the virus slowly retreating back into birds. Despite the case decrease, 
though, many leading health organizations continue to monitor this epizootic disease in birds 
across the globe in an attempt to stop the spread of a more transmissible strain of lethal H5N1228. 
This monitoring system encompasses two approaches: identifying flocks with H5N1 and 
cataloguing the new mutations noted in the virus. Identifying birds that carry H5N1 gives time 
for groups such as the WHO to cull the birds, as well as provide prophylaxis to those exposed, in 
an attempt to minimize H5N1 transmission from birds to humans. Culling infected birds also 
limits their ability to spread the disease to other mammals that can contract avian influenza 
viruses, such as pigs, limiting the virus’s ability to recombine with other strains of influenza that 
could cause H5N1 to become develop human transmissibility. Meanwhile, keeping track of viral 
mutations provides national and international health organizations the ability to quickly produce 
a vaccine if one of these strains does jump to humans and easily diffuses through the population.   
 
B: The Reality of Using Molecular Modifications to Predict the Next Pandemic 
 Critics of the virus monitoring program in birds have pointed out that we lack the ability 
to discern if a mutation in H5N1 makes the disease more transmissible until it is actually 
spreading through human populations229. Therefore, while these monitoring techniques may help 
speed up the vaccine creation process if the need arises, creating a vaccine could still take 
upwards of a year in development. By that point in the outbreak, millions of individuals would 
likely have contracted H5N1, and an untold number of them will have died230. Furthermore, 
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while public health officials lean on the idea that highly transmissible H5N1, if formed, would be 
effectively contained to birds through the culling and administrating of prophylaxis process, in 
2016-2017 we still saw 13 cases resulting in four deaths231. Though this number is small, it still 
demonstrates that, as an international community, we currently do not possess the tools to stop 
all bird to human H5N1 transmission. These holes in the WHO and other national and 
international health agencies plans on H5N1 containment are therefore viewed by some as 
inadequate for stopping a potential pandemic.  
 In 2012, a group of researchers based in the Netherlands and the United States provided 
what some public health officials view as much needed information and others a liability: the 
mutations needed to make H5N1 mammalian transmissible via airborne routes. Published in the 
June, 2012 issue of Science, a group of researchers at the Erasmus Medical Center in the 
Netherlands created a stain of H5N1 that can pass in the air between ferrets, using only wild 
H5N1232. Led by Ron Fouchier, this group took naturally occurring H5N1 from a 2005 outbreak 
of the disease in humans in Indonesia, and induced mutation through the serial passage of the 
virus in ferrets. The result was five mutations that Fouchier’s lab deems as “required” for H5N1 
to become transmissible in the air between ferrets. Ferrets have longed been utilized as model 
organisms for understanding influenza transmissibility in humans, and many results observed in 
these animals can often be applied to humans. Therefore wild types H5N1’s ability to mutate 
without recombination with other influenza viruses to become airborne in ferrets suggests that a 
possibly pandemic strain of this viruses could form just over time in humans. 
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Fouchier’s results have provided the world the exact mutations H5N1 may need to 
become transmissible through the air to humans, a major concern of the global health 
community. Fouchier’s experiments, though, also demonstrated that by acquiring these 
mutations for air transmission H5N1 becomes less pathogenic233. Therefore, these results provide 
not only a possible approach to monitoring H5N1, but also the knowledge that even if such a 
strain were to appear, the mortality rate would be lower than in previous H5N1 outbreaks. 
Furthermore, a study published in the same issue of Science looked into the probability of this 
pandemic strain of H5N1 mutating in humans. The paper found it highly improbable for a strain 
of H5N1 with none of these mutations to gain the modifications necessary to become airborne 
and infect humans234. Despite the low probability of these mutations occurring, two of the 
needed five mutations are already common in currently circulating forms of H5N1 in birds and 
another mutation sporadically appears235. The remaining two mutations have yet to appear in the 
virus’s RNA, although both were present in the H2 and H3 strains of avian flu that caused the 
1957 Avian Flu and 1968 Hong Kong Flu pandemics.  
 
C: The Ethics of Using Molecular Modification to Predict the Next Pandemic 
 The creation of such an easily transmissible strain of H5N1, although helpful for 
anticipating future possibly pandemic diseases, became a hotly contested topic both in the 
scientific and public health communities. In 2010, Fouchier and his group first reported that they 
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had created an airborne form of the highly pathogenic avian flu, and quickly gained the attention 
of many public health organizations around the globe. Despite this ground-breaking discovery 
many high-ranking officials, ranging from leaders of various nations and the WHO, urged the 
group to not publish their findings, claiming that this research should never have occurred236. 
Critics of Fouchier’s work believed not only that terrorists could utilize this mutated form of 
H5N1 as weapon, but also that the pathogen could escape the lab. Publishing the results and 
methods of creating such a strain would only strengthen these fears of H5N1 being used as a 
bioweapon or more research groups utilizing the mutant, since the paper could act as a template 
to recreate the virus.  
 Despite these mounting fears, though, Fouchier and his group published their findings in 
a 2012 Science article. Although initially requiring censorship for publication, three months prior 
to releasing the paper, a WHO panel decided that Fouchier’s work should remain uncensored, 
citing that the benefits from such a paper outweighed the risk237. The reversal on the committee’s 
take on the paper emphasizes the risk that many felt H5N1 could become pandemic. Experts in 
the field have described H5N1 actively circulating within bird populations as similar to “living 
on an active fault line”, highlighting the need to understand the virus rather than hope the needed 
mutations never occur238. Idealistically, knowing the specific mutations for H5N1 to become 
airborne will help improve the surveillance of the virus circulating in birds and activate an 
eradication effort of the disease if the more transmissible strain ever does appear. The efficiency 
of such a response, however, is debated. Although countries in Southeast Asia, where the H5N1 
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strain is most prevalent in bird populations, have better health infrastructure than the countries 
affected by the Ebola epidemic, they are also more populous. China, where the disease was first 
discovered in birds, has a population over 140 times the size of Sierra Leone with 1.38 billion 
people. The effect of these possibly pandemic viruses appearing in dense areas means that even 
if the response to airborne H5N1 was fast and efficient, it still may be too slow to stop the 
disease from spreading to millions of people in China alone. 
 Furthermore, the approval of the WHO committee to publish their research on airborne 
H5N1 does not mean Fouchier’s lab, and groups doing similar work on other diseases, should 
ignore the implications their research has on an ethical level. Even without publishing a paper, 
such work creates the risk of these dangerous pathogens escaping the laboratory setting. 
Although rather rare in occurrence, even in recent years researchers have accidently inoculated 
themselves with a number of viruses, included eradicated vaccinavirus239. While these accidental 
injections of pathogenic viruses do not guarantee exposure to civilians in the area, it does 
increase their likelihood. This situation may be problematic if these individuals are unaware, and 
therefore not consenting, of their proximity to these viruses.  
 The publishing of Fouchier’s paper also raises ethical concerns since the piece details 
how to create the airborne variant of H5N1, a possible biological weapon.  Although groups 
wishing to create such a weapon could do so without government funded research, publishing 
papers that detail the method of creating said strain provides a blueprint to these groups quicker 
than through unguided research. Even if the global community has yet to observe the creation of 
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weaponized H5N1, this does not minimize the possibility that such a strain exists240. The 
probability of releasing a weaponized strain remains low, though, due to difficulties in 
controlling influenza infections241.  Despite these difficulties, people are not always rational and 
betting on those creating biological weapons to realize the fallacies of using H5N1 remains a 
global security risk. The publishing of such a paper therefore places many civilians at threat for 
exposure of the pathogen as an act of biological terrorism, as well as creating a pandemic of 
airborne H5N1 through an unnatural manner. 
 Despite these threats to global security and the ethics behind conducting such research, 
understanding the mutations that could affect the spread of H5N1 remains a powerful tool in 
pandemic preparedness. Currently it takes five to six months to develop an influenza vaccine 
after identifying a possibly pandemic strain242. While in the timeline of outbreaks like the 2014 
Ebola epidemic that lasted two and a half years, the first six months may not seem imperative, 
researchers at the Institute of Disease Modeling have predicted that a particularly pathogenic 
strain of influenza could kill 30 million people during that time243,244. Having information 
surrounding possible mutations of H5N1, and other worrisome avian strains of influenza that 
may lead to a pandemic variant, could allow for the production of vaccines prior to the disease 
spilling over into humans, potentially saving millions. 
 
 
                                                      
240 Groseth, 2005. 
241 McNeil, 2012. 
242 WHO. 2015. “Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing Process and Timeline.” 
Emergencies Preparedness, Response.  
243 Gates, 2018.  
244 Karner, 2016. 
 60 
Chapter 5: Preparing for the Next Pandemic 
 As the world continues to wait for the next pandemic, we appear no closer to predicting 
the exact virus that will cause the outbreak. While many believe that the deadly virus will likely 
be caused by a novel strain of influenza, other infectious diseases, such as Ebola, continue to 
threaten global security. Furthermore, while technology has improved to let the global 
community better identify mutations that cause more pathogenic influenza strains, many are still 
wary of the ethical implications. All of these factors suggest that when the world is faced with its 
next large pandemic, we will not know what it looks like until possible millions are already 
infected. In order to minimize the spread and death associated with a pandemic virus therefore 
requires a system that not only recognizes a threat once it emerges in a human population, but 
also ensures that it will not spread to other regions around the globe. The best line of defense 
against a pandemic infectious disease therefore remains improving preventive measures against a 
variety of infectious diseases.  
 If the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic taught us anything, an efficient disease 
surveillance system in every country remains a great tool in catching possible pandemics while 
the disease is smoldering in the human population. To install such an interconnected system will 
require the cooperation nations around the globe, as well as organizations such as the WHO and 
MSF to mobilize the funds and resources needed. Some areas, such as the United States and 
Western Europe, already have highly sophisticated health care and public health systems that 
rely on just improving their technologies and general maintenance for effective disease detection 
and response. For others, such as Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, the health care and public 
health sectors of the countries are under developed due to years of systematic exploitation and 
histories of conflict, and therefore require more foreign aid to establish. Lastly, there are 
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countries such as China and India, that have developed health care and public health services, but 
are hotspots for emerging infectious diseases due to climate and high populations245. These 
countries therefore require more support than equally as developed, but less at-risk nations, to 
ensure effective detection and containment of emerging infectious diseases. 
 To better prepare for the next pandemic the global health community must combine 
aspects of global cooperation and technological innovation learned from past disease threats, 
epidemics, and pandemics. Past influenza pandemics have demonstrated the power that new 
technological assets, such as vaccinations and antibiotics, have in minimizing both mortality 
rates and the spread of these diseases. By coupling these advances in medical treatments with 
early response systems in particularly susceptible countries for emerging viral pathogens, the 
global health community can ensure rapid containment of infectious disease outbreaks.  
Furthermore, the WHO, as the sole government funded international health agency, must 
play a large role in directing improvements to infectious disease preparedness, as well as 
allocating resources to countries that are at the greatest risk for outbreaks. The recent slowness in 
the WHO and the rest of the international community’s response to the 2014 Ebola epidemic has 
demonstrated the systemic inefficiencies this organizations had in actually mobilizing resources 
to help combat infectious diseases. Changes to the global disease control and prevention 
procedures must be undertaken to curb these past failures and minimize the risks of a pandemic 
killing millions of people around the world.  
In order to better improve the global plan pandemic preparation, I propose a three-part 
approach that builds off the global public health community’s inability to predict what the next 
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pandemic pathogen will look like and where it will emerge, as well as inefficiencies in the global 
disease response to the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The first part of preparation will come from 
ensuring that every country has a functional and robust early disease detection system for 
humans, birds, and other mammals. Utilizing these early detection systems, the second part of 
this plan will analyze the genetic composition of novel pathogens to identify any similarities 
between past viruses that caused disease outbreaks. Finally, early vaccine development will 
begin for viruses that appear capable of and have the genetic markers of a virus causing a human 
disease outbreak. Together, these three steps of a novel emerging virus response will help limit 
the spread and severity of both epidemic and pandemic disease outbreaks. 
 
A: The Importance of an Early Detection Systems 
  The majority of pandemic diseases originate in animals before a spillover event allows 
the virus to jump from their original host into humans246. A number of these eventual pandemic 
pathogens therefore circulate in non-human species for an unspecified amount of time before 
they are identified in humans, providing a possible window for public health officials to identify 
these pathogens prior to human infection. In order to achieve early identification of these 
diseases, though, every country must have a virus detection system in place not only in humans, 
but also in other possible hosts. Already, the international community has emphasized the need 
for such a robust detection system with the 2005 International Health Regulations247. With the 
signing of the IHR, each of the 196 nations present agreed to instate a disease surveillance 
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system within the next five years248. In 2014, though, the Ebola epidemic demonstrated that a 
number of countries had failed to fulfill the IHR, exemplified by Guinea’s inability to catch the 
presence of ebolavirus for over three months. In order to gain an advantage against possibly 
pandemic diseases, the global health community must work together for the rigorous 
implementation of high functioning disease surveillance systems in every country. 
 Currently, many wealthy countries already have highly sophisticated disease surveillance 
systems with multiple automated centers allowing for larger data sets and quicker response times 
when looking for infectious diseases249. Every year many of these surveillance systems are 
improved upon in order to better monitor these outbreaks, with the 2014 Ebola epidemic 
inspiring changes to simplify notifiable disease reports 250. In contrast, the surveillance systems 
of less affluent countries either severely lack in identification abilities or do not exist at all251. 
While these discrepancies have widely been acknowledged in the wake of the 2014 epidemic and 
international groups, such as the CDC, have provided both funding and technical advice towards 
improving these countries surveillance and reporting systems, many systems still prove 
inadequate in identifying viral outbreaks252. A new way of implementing surveillance for disease 
outbreaks must be used to ensure that countries are actually receiving benefits from these 
technologies. 
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 To better implement surveillance and reporting systems for infectious diseases on a 
global level, international agencies must intervene and help set up these systems for nations 
lacking both the funding and knowledge to do so independently. While some organizations, such 
as the CDC, already provide such technical advice surrounding these systems, the failure to note 
any real changes in these countries surveillance abilities’ highlights the need of a more hands-on 
approach. Although such a model for setting up the surveillance of another country may seem to 
unethically over step the role of international aid, other methods of providing partial funding and 
support has allowed for these systems to continue to fail. While the global community has 
remained complacent in not establishing a connected network of disease detection and reporting, 
it places people all over the world at risk of a disease spreading and reaching pandemic levels 
before the international community becomes aware of its existence. Direct intervention by the 
WHO or other nations with more sophisticated systems may therefore exist as the best option for 
getting struggling countries surveillance systems off the ground. 
 Attempting to implement such technologies in multiple nations will be both time 
consuming and cost the global health community more than they can afford if such work occurs 
all at once. In order to minimize the cost while still ensuring that the global community is 
receiving pertinent information on diseases, the implantation of these surveillance systems 
should occur in waves. The first countries that should receive these technologies are ones that 
exist in regions where new zoonotic diseases are most likely to emerge from. These countries, 
such as the MRU countries most affected by the Ebola epidemic, exist at lower latitudes and are 
tropical in climate253. Special attention should be paid to nations with higher populations in these 
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areas, since a highly pathogenic strain could infect more individuals in these countries over a 
shorter amount of time. After addressing these hotspots for emerging diseases, surveillance 
systems should them be installed based on its affluence, with the most exploited and ignored 
countries getting preference for these surveillance systems over more affluent nations. Ideally, 
the countries that receive aid in setting up these technologies are ones that are completely lacking 
such infrastructure, meaning that they gain more knowledge from these technologies than the 
slightly more affluent nations with weak surveillance systems. By filling in the gaps of countries 
currently lacking functional surveillance systems, the global health community will be provided 
with information not only about what diseases are present in humans, but also in the surrounding 
animal populations.  
  
B: Genetic Analysis in Identifying Potentially Pandemic Viruses 
 By installing these surveillance systems into every country, the WHO and other disease 
control and prevention centers will know currently circulating pathogens that pose a risk of 
becoming epidemic or pandemic. While this information can prove invaluable, expanding these 
surveillance systems past humans could help the global community get in front of an infectious 
disease outbreak before it even occurs in humans. While this can also be helpful in identifying if 
viruses already known to infect humans are likely to reemerge in people based on its circulation 
in other animals, it can also help identify the risk of completely novel animal pathogens. In order 
for such information to actually have meaning other than the diseases present in non-humans, 
these new viruses must be genetically compared to past pathogens that have spread to humans 
and caused outbreaks. 
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Such an approach to identify future zoonotic viruses would employ some of the same 
principles as Ron Fouchier’s lab’s research on H5N1. Although his research looked to identify 
the mutations required to make avian H5N1 air transmissible between ferrets by repeated 
transmission, Fouchier’s work also began to identify a common mutation present in other 
airborne avian influenza strains. By running a genetic analysis of both the newly created H5N1 
strain and the pandemic influenza strains of 1957 and 1968, Fouchier identified two mutations 
common in all three types of the virus254. These commonalties could indicate a mutation required 
for all avian flus to gain air transmissibility in humans, an aspect of new influenza viruses that 
often raises concerns of the strain becoming pandemic.  
Other similarities between infectious diseases in both genetic make-up of pathogens that 
have caused disease outbreaks could be also be identified within viral families. These patterns 
could then be applied to newly discovered animal viruses of the same family to determine the 
likelihood of a spill over event occurring, as well as the severity of the human disease. Although 
the genetics of a virus is not the only determining factor of a spillover event255, nor will every 
new pathogen discovered resemble past disease-causing viruses in humans, the accumulation of 
this information could prove valuable in preparing and even stopping potentially pandemic 
diseases.  
 
C: Technological Advances on Medical Care: The Role of Vaccines in Pandemic Preparedness 
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 The most important part in preparing for a pandemic disease remains the response once 
an outbreak of a pathogen actually occurs. During the 1918 Influenza pandemic, millions of 
civilians died worldwide due to ineffective ways of treating the disease caused by the virus and 
secondary infections by bacterium. While many of ill received treatment from medical providers 
either in a hospital or a home setting, the majority of these methods proved ineffective256. 
Therefore, in order to stop people from dying due to infection, doctors and public health officials 
attempted to stop the spread of the disease using a number of non-pharmaceutical interventions, 
including isolation both of the sick and the healthy257. Forcing people to refrain from social 
interactions proved difficult to enforce, leading to the high death toll associated with the 1918 
outbreak.  
 In the century since the deadliest pandemic in modern history, there have been numerous 
improvements in medical technologies that have aided in reducing the mortality rates of 
subsequent influenza pandemics. The discovery of anti-viral drugs has helped limit the viral load 
of an infected induvial, increasing their chances of survival, while antibiotics have been 
imperative for the prevention of secondary bacterial infections linked with the majority of deaths 
during flu outbreaks. Since the 1918 pandemic, a number of preventive measures have also been 
improved upon. The most influential continues to be the flu vaccine, which first became readily 
available in 1946. The influenza vaccine causes the body to produce antibodies against the viral 
strain present in the vaccine, providing protection against subsequent infection by virus258.  
 While the influenza vaccine has provided at risk populations protection against 
developing the flu, such benefits only occur if the correct strain of the virus has been vaccinated 
                                                      
256 CDC. 2018. “1918 Pandemic (H1N1 Virus).” Pandemic Influenza. 2018.  
257 Ibid. 
258 CDC. 2019. “Different Types of Flu Vaccines.” Influenza (Flu).  
 68 
against. The decision of what strains are included in each version of the flu vaccine occurs twice 
a year by the WHO Collaborating Centers for Reference and Research on Influenza; once in 
February to determine the composition for the northern hemisphere and again in September to 
decide the same for the southern hemisphere259. The make-up of said vaccines are based off of 
the data collected by the 113 countries with influenza centers260. The previous season’s vaccine 
is then modified according to the most prevalent strain of influenza circulating in the human 
populations before distribution. Over the past fifteen years, the effectiveness of these vaccines in 
the United States have varied between 10 to 60%261. Therefore, while receiving the influenza 
vaccine can decrease one’s likelihood of developing the flu, it does not guarantee that every 
vaccinated individual will not get sick from the pathogen. The inability to correctly identify 
influenza strains present each flu season therefore continues to present shortcomings in utilizing 
this medical technique as a preventive measure against the virus.  
 The turnaround time needed to develop the seasonal flu vaccine following the strain 
identification is not indicative of the overall ability to produce efficient vaccines against other 
emerging infectious diseases, including pandemic strains of influenza. For completely novel 
diseases deemed to require a vaccine, development of these lifesaving medicines can take 
between ten to fifteen years to become publicly available262. For the ebolavirus Zaire subtype, 
research and development of the vaccine has occurred since 2000, and while the vaccine has 
                                                      
259 Stierwalt, Sabrina. 2015. “How Are Seasonal Flu Vaccines Made?” Scientific American.  
260 Ibid. 
261 Belongia, Edward A, Burney A Kieke, James G Donahue, Robert T Greenlee, Amanda 
Balish, Angie Foust, Stephen Lindstrom, David K Shay, and Marshfield Influenza Study 
Group. 2009. “Effectiveness of Inactivated Influenza Vaccines Varied Substantially with 
Antigenic Match from the 2004-2005 Season to the 2006-2007 Season.” The Journal of 
Infectious Diseases 199 (2): 159–67.  
262 The College of Physicians of Philadelphia. 2018. “Vaccine Development, Testing, and 
Regulation.” The History of Vaccines. 
 69 
been employed in the 2018-2019 Democratic Republic of the Congo outbreak, it has yet to be 
formally approved for general use263, 264. Although creating a vaccine against possibly pandemic 
strains of influenza take less time following the identification of the variant than with other novel 
pathogens, the average vaccine development time of five to six months is enough time to 
accumulate 30 million deaths worldwide265, 266.  Current development times of vaccines therefore 
makes it difficult to avoid the spread of possibly pandemic pathogen utilizing just this 
technology. 
 Aware of the limitations that vaccine development times presents researchers have begun 
turning their attention towards creating a universal influenza vaccine. While this vaccine does 
not negate the slow development time observed with emerging non-influenza viruses, it does 
provide immediate protection against possibly pandemic influenza variants267, 268. A universal 
influenza vaccine works by inducing the creation of antibodies that target the highly conserved 
head of the HA proteins in both human and avian strains of influenza A269. In April, 2019, the 
National Institute of Health (NIH) approved the first in-human trail of a universal influenza 
vaccine270. If the vaccine proves at least 75% effective against both types of influenza A viruses 
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and provides protection for at least a year, it will likely progress to a stage-two clinical trial as 
early as 2020271. The implications of an efficient universal influenza vaccine would not only save 
millions of lives during the early stages of an otherwise pandemic influenza, but it also would 
provide protection against all seasonal variants, saving resources in predicting and designing 
potentially ineffective vaccines.  
Creating a universal influenza vaccine is just one step towards protecting the world from 
witnessing another pandemic as severe as the 1918 Spanish influenza, not a full solution. As 
previously mentioned, the universal influenza vaccine is only effective in limiting the spread of 
influenza, not other emerging infectious diseases. The information gathered through the genetic 
analysis of monitored viruses in both humans and animals around the world will prove valuable 
both for identifying potential outbreaks of viruses in humans and for creating new vaccines 
against these emerging threats. As mentioned, the entire process of creating a new vaccine from 
discovering pathogen to the drug being approved for general use takes between ten and fifteen 
years. By identifying viruses in animals that may eventually spill over into humans, though, the 
innovation process for creating a vaccine against said viruses could begin long before the 
pathogen even appears in humans. Research into such vaccines should not occur with every 
novel virus found in animals in an effort to save funds. Rather, interest should only go into a 
small number of pathogens that show high likelihood for spill over based on their molecular 
make-up, as well as other epidemiological factors commonly observed in such events272.  
 Furthermore, even if a universal influenza vaccine was highly efficient and durable, it 
could only stop the spread of pandemic influenza if a large enough portion of the global 
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community were vaccinated, as is the case with a number of other infectious disease vaccines. 
Acquiring high enough vaccination rates to fully protect a population against an infectious 
disease remains a difficult problem for the global health community with established vaccines, 
therefore a new vaccine may prove even more difficult during its formatives years in reaching at 
risk populations. The world saw vacciniavirus (smallpox) eradicated in 1980, yet no other virus 
has followed suite due to difficulties in distributing vaccines for diseases such as measles and 
polio273. Regions of the world that have been successful in eliminating the above diseases have 
also experienced setbacks in achieving high vaccination rates, causing a resurgence in these 
pathogens due to the spread of misinformation surrounding vaccines274. Therefore, while 
vaccines remain a powerful tool in helping prevent the spread of epidemic or pandemic diseases, 
the global community still struggles with the efficient administration. Improvements into vaccine 
education and changing laws requiring vaccinations against preventable diseases may help raise 
vaccination rates in countries where these pathogens were once eliminated.  For administering 
the vaccines where disease persists due to poor living conditions, war, and/or systematic 
oppression, continued efforts by the WHO and other international organization may prove the 
best way to eradicate these pathogens. Regardless of these difficulties, though, the creation and 
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Conclusion 
 The world is not prepared for the next pandemic. The gap between rich and poor nation’s 
health systems allows for pathogens to slip through the cracks, increasing the risk of an 
infectious disease emerging and spreading through the world before adequate protective actions 
can take place. Although public health officials can try to predict the next pandemic, diseases the 
Western world views as threats have distracted them from other possibly pandemic pathogens. 
Even with technological improvements in molecular modification and computer programs that 
can model which pathogens may become pandemic, none of these results are ever guaranteed. 
Therefore, we cannot accurately predict the next pandemic, and rather must rely on public health 
initiatives and sophisticated health care systems to minimize the damage a pandemic virus could 
do around the world. 
Since the 1918, the global community has yet to observe another pathogen that infects or 
kills as many individuals as the Spanish influenza, largely due to the numerous improvements in 
both prevention and treatment of diseases caused by viruses and bacterium.  These 
improvements, while lowering the risk of new and emerging infectious diseases from becoming 
pandemic, do not guarantee that a similarly severe pandemic will never occur. Rather, our 
technological advances, both against pathogens and the natural world around us, has allowed the 
global population to boom since the mid-1700’s275. This exponential population growth puts 
more people in urban areas and closer to potential animal reservoirs and vectors for pathogens 
than ever before276. Furthermore, with the growing population, humans are producing more 
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greenhouses gases than ever, contributing to the increase in global temperatures and the range of 
pathogens previously identified as tropical277.  
Together, these conditions allow for the perfect storm of a pandemic outbreak. Humans 
are contracting more viruses from animals than ever before, and spreading them with more ease 
to one and other. While we cannot predict the exact viruses that emerge from these animals and 
that develop into epidemics or pandemics, the global health community can improve public 
health policies to better prepare for these outbreaks. Past epidemics and pandemics have 
illustrated just how far our technology has come in preventing widespread deaths by viruses with 
vaccines, antivirals, and antibiotics against secondary infections. They also have identified holes 
in our current approaches to diseases outbreaks. Learning from these failures remains our best 
chance in preventing public health emergencies like the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic or 
even the 2014 Ebola epidemic. In order to prevent repeating out history, though, we must 
continue improving upon on technologies in regards to public health. Early detection systems of 
viruses spreading both in humans and animals gives the public health community an idea where 
the next outbreak may occur, helping mobilize resources before they’re even needed. Gathering 
these data too can aid in finding patterns in which pathogens cause these outbreaks, possibly 
helping create vaccines against these viruses before they even emerge in humans. Even with 
these recommendations, work is needed to better prepare for the next pandemic. By 
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